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INTRODUCTION
The Liquidator's primary argument on appeal is that the "plain language of the
Reinsurance Agreements establishes that Anchor Wate has no interest in them." Anchor
Wate has never argued that it has an interest in the Reinsurance Agreements that SAIC
executed in 1981 and 1983. Anchor Wate's defense to the Liquidator's preference action
is based on a later agreement wherein the reinsurers agreed to reimburse SAIC on the
express condition that SAIC pay the Anchor Wate claim.
The Liquidator led the District Court into error by ignoring that separate agreement
and focusing instead on the earlier Reinsurance Agreements. Evidence of the second
agreement is based on the admissions of the Liquidator's attorney, the testimony of the
SAIC representative responsible for dealing with the reinsurers and upon the
correspondence and internal memoranda of SAIC. That evidence establishes as a matter
of law that the reinsurance proceeds were never intended to become the property of
SAIC. At the very least, that evidence raises a genuine issue of material fact precluding
summary judgment in favor of the Liquidator. Whether stated in terms of contract law,
"earmarking" or the equitable doctrine of constructive trust, the $3.5 million payment to
Anchor Wate does not constitute a voidable preference under U.C.A. § 31A-27-321.
Anchor Wate respectfully submits that the District Court erred when it granted summary
judgment in favor of the Liquidator.

I.
THE REINSURANCE PROCEEDS PAID TO ANCHOR WATE
WERE NOT PROPERTY OF SAIC
The Liquidator concedes that in order to prevail on his preference claim, he must
establish as a matter of law that the payments SAIC made to Anchor Wate were a
"transfer of SAIC's property." Liquidator Brief at 11. The Liquidator argues he satisfied
this element of a preference claim because "the plain language of the Reinsurance
Agreements establishes that Anchor Wate has no interest" in the reinsurance payments.
Liquidator Brief at 13-16.
The relevant question here, however, is not whether Anchor Wate had an interest
under the reinsurance treaties in the payments made to SAIC, but whether those payments
were the property of SAIC at the time they were transferred to Anchor Wate. Anchor
Wate has never argued that it is a third party beneficiary of the 1981 and 1983
Reinsurance Agreements between the reinsurers and SAIC. Rather, Anchor Wate's
defense to the preference action is based on the 1991 agreement between SAIC and the
reinsurers that is evidenced by the Liquidator's own admission through his attorney (R548), the testimony of the SAIC representative responsible for the negotiations with the
reinsurers (R-417-418) and the correspondence of SAIC and the reinsurers. (R-1254; R1235-1236; R-1277). The Liquidator's preference claim fails as a matter of law because
the reinsurers made payments to SAIC only after SAIC represented and agreed that those
payments "were specifically to be used to pay the Anchor Wate claim." (R-417-418).
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Under federal bankruptcy law (which Utah Courts look to for guidance in
construing Section 31A-27-321), the appropriate test for determining whether funds paid
to an insolvent debtor by a third party are "property of the estate" is "whether the debtor
had the right to disburse the funds to whomever it wished, or whether their disbursement
was limited" pursuant to an agreement between the debtor and the third party "that the
new funds will be used only to pay a specified creditor." In re Superior Stamp & Coin
Co.. Inc., 223 F.3d 1004, 1009 (9th Cir. 2000); In re Safe-T-Brake of South Florida, Inc.,
162 B.R. 359, 364 (S.D. Fla. 1993) ("funds entrusted to the debtor with the understanding
that the debtor is to use the money only to pay the debtor's obligations to a specific
creditor designated by the source of the funds" are not "property of the estate" for
preference purposes because "the debtor effectively holds the money 'in trust' for the
benefit of the designated creditor. . . .").
Here, the undisputed facts establish that SAIC did not have the "right to disperse
the funds to whomever it wished." Superior Stamp, 223 F.3d at 1009. Internal
memoranda and correspondence between SAIC and its reinsurers reveal that the $4.6
million in reinsurance funds paid to SAIC were expressly intended for the purpose of
settling the claim against Anchor Wate. In a July 30, 1991 Letter to Skandia, SAIC
confirmed the reinsurer's "telephone instructions" to submit an unconditional offer of
$5,000,000. The letter states that "Skandia gave their cstamp of approval' to tender the
contract limits of $5 million" to settle the claim. (R-1235). In fact, in sending the checks
to SAIC, the reinsurers specified on the front of each check that the funds were intended
3

for the "Permanent Concrete & Anchor" claim. (R-1282, 1284-1285). That Anchor Wate
did not have the right to demand payment directly from the reinsurers does not alter the
fact that SAIC and the reinsurers agreed that the "reinsurance monies . . .were specifically
to be used to pay the [Anchor Wate] claim." (R-417-418). This was clearly in the best
interest of the reinsurers given their obligation to cover a judgment in excess of the
reinsurance limits as a result of "alleged or actual bad faith, fraud or negligence in
rejection of a settlement within" policy limits. (R-322). Having made that agreement,
SAIC had no "right to receive and keep those proceeds." In Re Edgewortbu 993 F.2d 51,
55(5thCir. 1993).
II.
APPLICATION OF THE EARMARKING DOCTRINE IN
PREFERENCE ACTIONS ARISING UNDER SECTION 31A-27-321
IS CONSISTENT WITH THE PURPOSE AND INTENT
OF THAT SECTION
The Liquidator argues that the earmarking doctrine applies only to loan situations
where the funds at issue were paid to the insolvent debtor by a guarantor of the debtor's
original loan. Liquidator Brief at 20-22. Citing In re Moses. 256 B.R. 641 (10th Cir.
BAP 2000), the Liquidator argues that extension of the doctrine beyond the guarantor
situation is not warranted because the public policy reason for applying that doctrine - the
risk that a guarantor will have to pay twice if the first payment is held to be a voidable
preference - is not present where the new lender is not a guarantor himself. In re Moses,
256 B.R. at 646.

4

In making that argument, the Liquidator ignores other important public policy
reasons for applying the earmarking doctrine to prevent insurance liquidators from
avoiding agreements between an insurance company and its reinsurer directing the use of
reinsurance proceeds to settle a particular claim against the insurer. First, a reinsurer
should have the right to limit its liability through the settlement of claims that are covered
by its reinsurance obligation. In this case, counsel representing SAIC in the coverage
action filed by Anchor Wate advised SAIC that the insurers' "exposure could exceed one
hundred eight million dollars" and if trebled, then $324,000,000. (R-1231). SAIC's
reinsurers made an informed decision to eliminate their own risk of liability for that
staggering amount by agreeing to pay $4.6 million to SAIC based on the express
understanding that the purpose and intent of that payment was to reimburse SAIC for
payment of the Anchor Wate settlement. In return, the reinsurers received a release of all
liability, including the reinsurers' express contractual liability for any "judgment"
rendered against an original insured which is in excess of the limits provided by the
reinsured's policy and for which the reinsured is held liable as a result of alleged or actual
bad faith. (R-322). Application of the earmarking doctrine to such payments by
reinsurers will allow reinsurers to limit their exposure by preventing liquidators from
avoiding or impeding settlements that protect the reinsurers from increased risk.
Courts in other jurisdictions have rejected preference claims against the recipients
of reinsurance proceeds where, as in this case, the reinsurers had a direct interest in
limiting their own risk through settlement. See, Venetsantos v. Zucker, Facher & Zucker,
5

271 N.J. Super. 459, 638 A.2d 1333, 1338 (N.J. App. 1994), and Koken v. Legion Ins.
Co., 831 A.2d 1196, aff'd 878 A.2d 51 (Pa. 2005). As in Venetsantos, payment by the
reinsurers of Anchor Wate's claim against an insolvent insurer does not constitute a
voidable preference where the reinsurers were actively involved in the settlement of that
claim and benefitted directly from the payment by obtaining a release of all liability,
including all bad faith claims. (R-389).
Second, the policy behind Section 31A-27-321 — preventing an insolvent insurer
"from paying off its favorite creditors on the eve of liquidation" (Wilcox v. CSX Corp.,
2003 UT 21 | 6, 70 P.3d 85, 90) » is not implicated where the decision to settle is
controlled and dictated by the reinsurer. Here, the decision to settle the Anchor Wate
claim was made by the reinsurers to protect their own interests and not to benefit a
"favorite creditor" of SAIC. The Liquidator's power to void otherwise lawful settlement
agreements does not extend to agreements that are approved, authorized and funded by
entities that are not directed or controlled by the insolvent insurer.
Third, the District Court's application of Section 31A-27-321 to invalidate
settlement agreements approved and funded by the reinsurers of an insurer is also
contrary to the strong public policy favoring settlements. As the Utah Court of Appeals
recently observed:
The Utah Supreme Court has stated "[i]t is a basic rule that the law
favors the settlement of disputes." Such "[settlements are favored in
the law, and should be encouraged, because of the obvious benefits
accruing not only to the parties, but also to the judicial system.
6

In re Adoption of E.HL 2004 Ut. App. 419 t 12, 103 P.3d 177, 180 (citations omitted).
Consistent with that strong policy, Section 31A-27-321 should not be construed as
granting insurance liquidators broad power to invalidate multi-party settlement
agreements where the insolvent insurer is in effect a nominal participant in an agreement
that is approved and funded by the reinsurers and there is no evidence that those funds
would have been paid to the estate but for that agreement. Section 31 A-27-321 should
not be construed as granting insurance liquidators the power to disrupt and invalidate
complex multi-party settlement agreements based on the involvement of a single
insolvent insurer.
III.
THE EARMARKING DOCTRINE IS DIRECTLY APPLICABLE
TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE
A.

SA1C AND THE REINSURERS AGREED THAT THE REINSURANCE
PROCEEDS WERE EARMARKED FOR THE ANCHOR WATE CLAIM
The Liquidator argues that "there was no agreement between SAIC and its

reinsurers requiring that the reinsurance funds were targeted to pay the specific claims of
Anchor Wate". Liquidator's Brief at 23. In his effort to explain away the evidence of
that agreement, the Liquidator ignores the admission contained in a memorandum drafted
by one of his own attorneys who reviewed the record of SAIC s dealings with the
reinsurers on the Anchor Wate matter and concluded:
My understanding is that in both cases copies of the checks
purportedly in payment of the losses were presented to the reinsurers.
Based on the representation that the losses had been paid by the
checks the reinsurers then met their obligations to SAIC. SAIC then
7

cancelled or voided the checks and used the funds from the reinsurers
for purposes other than paying the underlying claims.
(R-548).
That admission proves (or at a minimum presents an issue of fact), that the
reinsurers agreed to reimburse SAIC based on SAIC's "representation" that the Anchor
Wate claim had already been paid. A similar reimbursement agreement was construed as
"earmarking" in In re Superior Stamp & Coin Co., Inc.. 223 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2000),
where the court rejected a bankruptcy trustee's attempt to recover funds paid to a creditor
of the insolvent debtor pursuant to an agreement whereby the debtor's bank agreed to
reimburse the debtor for checks issued to the preference defendant. Applying the
earmarking doctrine, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that "the amount for which
the bank reimbursed [the debtor]" was not subject to the trustee's preference power "so
long as the funds are advanced on the condition that they be used to pay that specific
creditor." 223 F.3d at 1006, 1011.
Here, the Liquidator concedes that $3.5 million was reimbursed to SAIC by the
reinsurers "based on the representation that the losses had been paid by the checks" SAIC
issued and presented to the reinsurers. (R-548). Those funds were clearly "earmarked"
for payment of the Anchor Wate claim and do not qualify as a preference under U.C.A.
§ 31A-27-321. The Liquidator's attempt to distinguish In re Superior Stamp & Coin Co.,
Inc. on the ground that "there were no agreements between SAIC and its reinsurers that
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the reinsurance funds were to be paid to Anchor Wate" is simply contradicted by his own
attorney's summary of the reimbursement agreement between SAIC and the reinsurers.
Similarly, the Liquidator's admission that the $3.5 million was intended as
reimbursement for the Anchor Wate claim is consistent with the testimony of the SAIC
representative responsible for representing SAIC in its negotiations with the reinsurers.
Mr. Rex Hess testified that based on his "discussions and dealings with the reinsurance"
he understood that the reinsurance monies "were specifically to be used to pay the Anchor
Wate claim." (R-417-418).
The Liquidator argues that "it was not error for the district court to conclude that
Mr. Hess was not in a position to know how the reinsurance proceeds would be utilized or
applied, nor whether they would be passed directly to Anchor Wate." In determining
whether summary judgment is appropriate, "the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom" must be viewed "in the light most favorable to the non-moving party."
Shattuck-Owen v. Snowbird Corp., 16 P.3d 555, 558 (2000). At the very least, the fact
that SAIC management permitted Hess to act as the company representative in
negotiations with the reinsurers raises a genuine issue of fact as to whether Mr. Hess was
in "a position to know" about the agreement between SAIC and the reinsurers to use the
reinsurance monies "to pay the Anchor Wate claim." (R-417-418). See e.g., ShattuckOwen, 16 P.3d at 560 (reversing summary judgment in favor of the employer on the
ground that genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether employer's human
resources director had the authority to contract on employer's behalf where the employer
9

permitted the director to act as its representative in attempting to address the plaintiffs
needs).
B.

THE EARMARKING AGREEMENT WAS PERFORMED WHEN SAIC PAID
ANCHOR WATE
The agreement to reimburse SAIC for the Anchor Wate claim was performed when

the reinsurers paid SAIC based on SAIC's representation that the Anchor Wate claim had
been paid. Although those representations were false (in that SAIC waited until after it
received the reinsurance payments to pay Anchor Wate), SAIC paid $3.5 million of the
insurance proceeds to Anchor Wate after it received the reinsurance proceeds.
C.

SAIC LACKED CONTROL OVER THE REINSURANCE PROCEEDS
BECAUSE IT DID NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO DISBURSE THOSE FUNDS
TO WHOMEVER IT WISHED
The Liquidator argues that SAIC "acquired and maintained total control over the

reinsurance proceeds'1 because they were "deposited into SAIC's general checking
account at Zions." Liquidator Brief at 27-28. Relying on bankruptcy cases where the
earmarking doctrine was not even discussed, the Liquidator contends that "funds
deposited into a bank account are presumed to be owned by the entity in whose name the
account is established." Id., citing In re Amdura. 75 F.3d 1447, 1451 (10th Cir. 1996).
Those cases are inapposite here where the issue is one of control, not "ownership". In In
re Superior Stamp & Coin, the court held under similar circumstances that funds
deposited into an insolvent debtor's account are not "controlled" by the debtor for
purposes of avoiding application of the earmarking doctrine:
10

The fact that [the debtor] may have had the power to divert the loan
after it was deposited into the [debtor's] account does not amount to
"control" of the funds by [the debtor] . . . Accordingly, the proper
inquiry is not whether the funds entered the debtor's account but
whether the debtor had the right to disburse the funds to whomever it
wished, or whether their disbursement was limited to a particular old
creditor or creditors under the new agreement with the new creditor.
223F.3dat 1009.
Here, SAIC's right to disburse the reinsurance proceeds was limited by the
agreement with the reinsurers in which SAIC represented that those proceeds would be
used to reimburse SAIC for payments made to Anchor Wate. (R-548). Having made
such representations, SAIC did not have the right to disburse those funds to "whomever it
wished." The Liquidator cannot establish as a matter of law that SAIC had "control" of
the reinsurance proceeds for purposes of defeating application of the earmarking doctrine.
D.

THE PAYMENT OF $3.5 MILLION TO ANCHOR WATE HAD NO IMPACT
ON SAIC'S ESTATE BECAUSE THOSE FUNDS WERE REIMBURSED TO
SAIC BY THE REINSURERS
SAIC argues that Anchor Wate cannot establish the fourth requirement for

earmarking - that the transfer lacked a substantial impact on the estate - because "if the
$3,500,000 had not been paid to Anchor Wate, this money would have been available to
pay ah similarly situated creditors of SAIC." Liquidator Brief at 29. The Liquidator
simply ignores the undisputed fact that the payment to Anchor Wate from the SAIC estate
was reimbursed in full to the estate by the reinsurers. (R-3 66-3 66 A). Any depletion of
the SAIC estate caused by the payment to Anchor Wate was more than offset by the
reinsurance proceeds it received. That undisputed fact distinguishes this case from
11

Wilcox v. CSX Corp.. 2003 UT 21, 70 P.3d 85, where the Utah Supreme Court held that
a $308,000 payment made by SAIC to CSX constituted a voidable preference. Here, the
transfer of SAIC funds to Anchor Wate were reimbursed to the estate by the reinsurers.
The District Court erred in its conclusion that the Liquidator demonstrated as a matter of
law that the earmarking doctrine had no application to the facts of this case.
IV.
THE INSURANCE PROCEEDS PAID TO ANCHOR WATE WERE
NOT PROPERTY OF THE "INSURER" BECAUSE THOSE FUNDS
WERE HELD IN CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST BY SAIC
The Liquidator argues that "Anchor Wate has failed as a matter of law to establish
the requirements for establishing a constructive trust under Utah law." Anchor Wate
presented more than sufficient evidence to establish a constructive trust under both
federal and state law.
A.

UNDER FEDERAL LAW INSURANCE PROCEEDS IN THE POSSESSION OF
A PARTY WHO IS NOT THE INTENDED BENEFICIARY OF THOSE
PROCEEDS ARE NOT "PROPERTY OF THE ESTATE" FOR PURPOSES OF
ESTABLISHING A PREFERENCE
In construing Section 31A-27-321(1), Utah courts look to the Federal Bankruptcy

Code for guidance. See, Wilcox v. CSX Corp.. 2003 UT 21 f 9, 15; 70 P.3d 85, 92.
Federal courts construing federal bankruptcy law have observed that Congress expressly
approved the use of "constructive trusts" to exclude insurance proceeds intended for the
benefit of another party from the property of a debtor's bankruptcy estate. See. In re
Unicom Computer Corp.. 13 F.3d 321, 324 (9th Cir. 1994).
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The Liquidator argues that the "insurance proceeds" example in the legislative
history of the Federal Bankruptcy Code "is not intended to declare a federal constructive
trust remedy supplanting state law requirements, but merely presupposes that the elements
of a constructive trust (such as a wrongful act by the debtor under Utah law), have been
met in the example." Liquidator's Brief at If 32. The Liquidator offers no authority for
this proposition and simply ignores the federal decisions holding that proceeds of a
debtor's liability policy do not constitute "property of the estate". See, e.g.. In re
Edgeworth. 993 F.2d 51, 55 (5th Cir. 1993); In re Sfuzzi Inc., 191 B.R. 664, 667 (Bkrtcy.
N.D. Tex. 1996); In re Babcock & Wilcox Co.. 2001 WL 536305 at *5 (E.D. La. 2001).
The Liquidator's argument that this Court should ignore federal law on the issue of
constructive trusts is contrary to the Utah Supreme Court's direction that Utah courts look
to the Federal Bankruptcy Code for guidance in construing Section 31A-27-321.
The Liquidator argues that this Court should decline to address the federal cases
cited by Anchor Wate because "Anchor Wate did not raise this argument at the district
court." Liquidator Brief at pg. 18. In fact, Anchor Wate raised this argument in briefs
submitted to the District Court when it quoted that section of the legislative history which
states that under federal bankruptcy law, the constructive trust remedy is appropriate in
the context of liability insurance proceeds. (See, R-l 161-1166). The undisputed facts
establish that the reinsurance proceeds paid to SAIC were held in constructive trust and
did not constitute "property of the insurer" for purposes of Section 31A-27-321.

13

B.

THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO THE DISTRICT COURT ESTABLISHES A
CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST UNDER UTAH LAW
The Liquidator argues that the requirements for establishing a constructive trust

under Utah law "are not met here." See, Liquidator's Brief at pg. 32-36. First, the
Liquidator argues that a constructive remedy is not appropriate here because "there was
no wrongful act". This argument is surprising considering that the Liquidator's attorney
drafted a memorandum which states that SAIC obtained the funds from the reinsurers by
misrepresenting "that the losses had been paid" by checks that SAIC subsequently
cancelled or voided and described such action as "fraud". (R-548). That evidence is
more than sufficient to satisfy the "wrongful act" requirement that the Liquidator
contends is required under Utah law.
The Liquidator also argues that "Anchor Wate's claim to a constructive trust fails
as a matter of law because SAIC was not unjustly enriched by receiving payments under
its own contracts for which it had paid all of the premiums to protect itself on its own
insurance obligations." Liquidator's Brief at pg. 34. This argument ignores the
undisputed fact that SAIC obtained proceeds from the reinsurers by agreeing that those
funds would be used to pay the Anchor Wate claim. In fact, SAIC obtained the funds by
presenting the reinsurers with "copies of the check purportedly in payment of the losses"
that SAIC then "cancelled or voided". (R-548). It would be both wrongful and unjust for
SAIC to divert funds intended for the payment of Anchor Wate's claim to its own use.
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This evidence is more than sufficient to satisfy the unjust enrichment requirement under
Utah law.
Finally, the Liquidator argues that "Anchor Wate's constructive trust argument also
fails because Anchor Wate did not trace the reinsurance funds into a trust that was held
for Anchor Wate's benefit by SAIC". This argument fails for several reasons. First,
federal courts construing the Federal Bankruptcy Preference Provision have held that the
burden of tracing the funds used to make preferential payments is on the trustee. See, In
re Smith's Home Furnishings. Inc., 265 F.3d 959 (9th Cir. 2001). The Liquidator argues
that Smith's Home Furnishings is not applicable because that case "is not a constructive
trust case, but instead dealt with a dispute over entitlement to a commingled account."
That case is directly applicable here because it involved application of the Federal
Bankruptcy Preference Provision (11 U.S.C. § 547(b)), which the Utah Supreme Court
has looked to in construing Section 31A-27-321. Requiring the Liquidator to bear the
burden of tracing in an insurance liquidation is appropriate for the same reason that
bankruptcy trustees have that burden: "it is the trustee who accedes to the debtor's books
and records and has easier access and a better ability to divine the financial activities of
the debtor in its last months of operation." Id. at 967. That reasoning applies with equal
force to insurer liquidations under the Utah Insurance Code.
Second, in the context of summary judgment the Liquidator has the burden of
demonstrating that he is entitled to summary judgment based on undisputed facts. Anchor
Wate has offered more than sufficient evidence to raise an issue of fact concerning
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whether the payment it received from SAIC can be traced to the reinsurance proceeds.
See, evidence cited at pgs. 36-38 of Anchor Wate's Brief. Anchor Wate presented
evidence that $4,600,813.34 ($4,026,237.02 (R-366) plus $452,951.66 (R-366A) plus
$121,624.66 (R-382)), of reinsurance proceeds were deposited into Account No. 032144107 on November 4 and 13, 1991. All but $15,000 in that account was swept into
Account No. 81142515 on a daily basis. (R-376). SAIC's bank records (R-376-7) show
that the net transfers of credits and debits to Account No. 81142515 never dropped below
$3,650,478.96 after the November 4, 1992 deposit through the end of the month, and just
nine days before the reinsurance money was apparently moved back to Account 032144107 and paid to Anchor Wate. The Liquidator, who has possession of SAIC's bank
records, has remained silent on this evidence tracing the reinsurance proceeds back to the
Account from which the payments were made to Anchor Wate.
Thus, the bank evidence presented by Anchor Wate precludes summary judgment
under Utah law where the trier of fact in a constructive trust/tracing case has "the
prerogative of finding not only facts based upon direct evidence, but also those which
may be established from the reasonable inferences that may be deduced therefrom."
Corp. of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of LPS v. Jollev. 24 UT 2d 187, 189,
467 P.2d 984, 985 (Utah 1970). The evidence in the Record regarding the deposit and
transfer of the reinsurance proceeds between the two accounts controlled by SAIC is
more than sufficient to support the inference, if not the undisputed fact, that the payment
to Anchor Wate was derived from the reinsurance proceeds. Accordingly, the Liquidator
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was not entitled to summary judgment on the ground that those payments constitute
"transfers of the insurer's property" as a matter of law.
V.
SAIC'S ESTATE WAS NOT DEPLETED BY THE $3.5 MILLION
PAYMENT THAT SAIC MADE TO ANCHOR WATE BECAUSE
THE ESTATE WAS REIMBURSED BY A TOTAL OF $4.6 MILLION
AS A RESULT OF THE ANCHOR WATE CLAIM
In order to establish that the payments to Anchor Wate enabled it "to obtain a
greater percentage of [its] debt than another creditor of the same class would receive", the
Liquidator must prove that the SAIC estate was depleted by the Anchor Wate payment.
The Liquidator argues that the payment to Anchor Wate depleted the SAIC estate because
the "reinsurance money came into SAIC's possession not through any efforts of Anchor
Wate but because SAIC had obtained indemnification contracts for its own liabilities."
Liquidator's Brief at pg. 44.
Again, that argument ignores the conclusion reached by the Liquidator's own
attorney who wrote that the reinsurers paid SAIC only after being presented with "checks
purportedly in payment of the [Anchor Wate] losses" and "based on representations [by
SAIC] that the losses had been paid." (R-548). Any depletion of the estate by the
payment of $3.5 million to Anchor Wate was more than reimbursed by the $4.6 million
that would not have been paid but for SAIC's agreement to pay Anchor Wate as a
condition for receiving payments from the reinsurers.
The Liquidator offered no evidence to establish that he could have obtained $3.5
million from the reinsurers but for SAIC's representation to the reinsurers that SAIC had
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paid Anchor Wate. Absent such evidence, the Liquidator cannot establish that the
payment to Anchor Wate deprived the S AIC estate of funds that would have been
available to pay other creditors but for that payment. That undisputed fact required
judgment in favor of Anchor Wate on the Liquidator's preference claim and is therefore
reversible error.
VI.
THE COURT SHOULD LOOK TO FEDERAL BANKRUPTCY LAW IN
DETERMINING THE PRE-JUDGMENT INTEREST RATE FOR
PREFERENCE CLAIMS UNDER U.C.A. § 31A-27-321
In arguing against the application of the Federal Bankruptcy doctrine that 28
U.S.C. § 1961 provides the relevant interest rate in preference actions, and is therefore
instructive in interpreting the preference provisions of Utah's Insurance Code, the
Liquidator advances three distinct arguments: (1) the prejudgment interest rate is
governed by U.C.A. § 15-1-1 because the Liquidator's actions constitute "forbearance";
(2) alternatively, even if Section 15-1-1 does not apply the proper prejudgment interest
rate should be determined by adding two percent to the prime interest rate at the time of
the transfers; and (3) the record below does not support the application of the rate dictated
bv 28 U.S.C. $ 1961.
A.

THE LIQUIDATOR'S ACTIONS DO NOT CONSTITUTE FORBEARANCE
The Liquidator concedes that there is no contract that would mandate the

application of the statutory interest rate set forth at U.C.A. § 15-1-1. Under former Chief
Justice Zimmerman's interpretation of that section, that admission is dispositive and
18

requires reversal of the District Court's ruling that Section 15-1-1 governs the rate of
prejudgment interest here. See, Consolidated Coal Co. v. Utah Div. of State Lands &
Forestry, 886 P.2d 514 at n.13 (Utah 1994).
Ignoring Consolidated Coal, the Liquidator attempts to justify application of the
ten percent statutory rate by arguing that there has been a "forbearance" on the part of the
Liquidator in that he has had to "wait" for the duration of this litigation to collect on the
alleged preference payment. Such a position is contrary to the legal definition of a
forbearance:1
Forbearance has been defined as: The renunciation, repudiation,
abandonment or surrender of some claim, right, privilege, or of the
opportunity to take advantage of some defect, irregularity, or wrong.
An expressed or implied relinquishment of a legal right.
4000 Park Avenue, LLC v. Italian Cmty. Center of Greater Bridgeport, Inc., No 40841,
1999 WL 1456627 at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct., Oct. 14, 1999). In the context of a debtorcreditor relationship, forbearance occurs where a creditor forbears from collecting on a
debt because of some promise by the debtor to the creditor. See, e.g.. State Bank of Lehi
v. Woolsey, 565 P.2d 413, 416-17 (Utah 1977) ("When a debtor and creditor agree that an
interest bearing debt shall be extended for a fixed time, the promise of each is of
something detrimental, as the creditor promises to forbear the collection of his claim

'Forbearance is closely connected to the concept of promissory estoppel. See, e.g.,
Johannessen v. Canyon Road Towers Owners Ass'n, 57 P.3d 1119, 1123, 2002 UT App
332, ^f 21 (Utah Ct. App. 2002) (requiring party seeking to prove promissory estoppel to
show a promise which the promisor "should reasonably expect to induce action or
forbearance" on the part of the promissee).
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and the debtor gives up his power to stop the accrual of further interest by the payment of
the principal at maturity. Accordingly such agreements are generally upheld.") (emphasis
added).
The facts of this case do not support the Liquidator's assertion that there has been a
forbearance here. The Liquidator has not waited to collect its alleged debt. It has not
refrained from enforcing a right, or renounced, repudiated, abandoned or surrendered its
claim. Rather, it has pressed forward in asserting its purported preference rights against
Anchor Wate. As such, the liquidator's "wait" for the funds disputed in this action was
not induced by any promise to the Liquidator on the part of Anchor Wate or any
corresponding forbearance by the Liquidator, but rather by the realities of the litigation
process. Because there has been no forbearance, by its own terms Section 15-1-1 cannot
apply to this case. As a result, and pursuant to Wilcox, the District Court erred in failing
to look to the federal bankruptcy rate in assessing any prejudgment interest against
Anchor Wate.
B.

FEDERAL BANKRUPTCY LAW SETS THE PREJUDGMENT INTEREST
RATE AS THE 52-WEEK T-BILL AUCTION RATE IMMEDIATELY PRIOR
TO THE DATE OF JUDGMENT, RENDERING THE MARKET RATE OF
INTEREST AT THE TIME OF THE TRANSFERS IRRELEVANT
In another attempt to justify an award often percent interest, the Liquidator argues

that the proper pre-judgment interest rate can be ascertained by adding two percent to the
prime interest rate at the time of the transfers and then discusses the evidence in the
record of the prime rate in October of 1991. This is in clear contradiction of the
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bankruptcy doctrine that the pre-judgment interest rate is governed by the 52-week T-Bill
auction rate "immediately prior to the date of judgment." In re Nucorp Energy Inc.. 902
F.2d 729, 734 (9th Cir. 1990); see abo 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a) (providing that the rate of
interest is "the average accepted auction price for the last auction of fifty-two week
United States Treasury bills settled immediately prior to the date of the judgment")
(emphasis added)).2
Thus, the clear teaching of Wilcox that federal bankruptcy law should be used to
interpret the voidable preference provisions of U.C.A. § 31A-27-321, required the District
Court to look to the accepted auction price for fifty-two week United States Treasury bill
settled on July 3, 2003, the date judgment was entered. Had the District Court so done, it
would have found that the correct rate was 1.07 percent. See,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/hl 5/20030701. Given the lengthy period at issue,
the difference between the potential prejudgment interest awards based on either 1.07
percent or 10 percent is quite significant. The relevant period ran from March 25, 1994
(the date the preference action was filed), until July 3, 2003 (the date of the judgment), a
span of almost ten years. By stipulation, the Liquidator and Anchor Wate agreed, in
settling their dispute over whether the Liquidator had been delinquent in producing
documents, to eliminate three years of the prejudgment interest period. Accordingly, the

2

It is also in express contradiction of the Stipulation and Agreement between the
Liquidator and Anchor Wate, which specifies that the Liquidator will not seek any
prejudgment interest before March 24, 1994. (R-1382).
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relevant term runs from March 25, 1997 to July 3, 2003, or a period of six years, one
hundred days. At 1.07 percent, prejudgment interest for this duration would total
$234,960.27. In stark contrast, at ten percent, interest over this period would equal
$2,195,890.40. Thus, almost two million dollars hinge on a determination of the
appropriate interest rate. The District Court erred when it failed to apply the federal
bankruptcy prejudgment rate to this preferential action.
C.

THE RECORD BELOW SUPPORTS APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL
BANKRUPTCY RATE OF 28 U.S.C. § 1961
1.

Anchor Wate argued for a market rate below.

Yet another permutation of the Liquidator's argument in favor of a ten percent
interest award involves a complete misreading of the record below, namely the
Liquidator's argument that Anchor Wate presented evidence below that the proper market
rate of prejudgment interest was ten percent (the prime rate of eight percent plus two
percent). A careful reading of Anchor Wate's Opposition to the Liquidator's Cross
Motion for Summary Judgment reveals a very different set of facts. The "prime plus two
percent" computation of interest discussed therein was based on contract, not market
rate; it was taken from a settlement agreement dated March 11, 1992, between Anchor
Wate, Permanent Concrete and SAIC. (R-554). That settlement agreement addressed
interest on the Liquidator's payment of $2,000,000 to Anchor Wate, a completely
different obligation than the alleged preference that is at issue here. It is undisputed that
Anchor Wate did not receive this payment.
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Paragraph 4 of the March 11, 1992 Settlement Agreement provides as follows:
4. Default. If Southern shall default in the payment of
any of the payments required by this agreement, Southern shall
on demand pay the entire $2,000,000 and shall pay interest on
$2,000,000 at a rate per annum equal to two percent (2%) in
excess of the then current prime rate of interest charged by
the Morgan Guaranty Trust Co., calculated from October 1,
1991, until the date of final payment. In the event of failure of
Southern to make any payment specified in this agreement, the
$2,000,000 together with accrued and unpaid interest thereon
shall immediately become due and payable. Except as
expressly provided presentment, demand, protest and all other
notices of any kind are hereby expressly waived by Southern.
In the event of default, Southern further agrees to pay
reasonable attorney's fees, court costs, and other expenses
incurred by Anchor Wate and Permanent Concrete, Inc. in
protection of their rights caused by Southern's default.
(R-554) (emphasis added). Thus, the contractual interest rate of prime plus two percent
does not apply to the funds at issue here, which are not the subject of the March 11, 1992
Settlement Agreement. Indeed, Anchor Wate did not argue below for the application of
the "prime plus two" rate to the alleged preference payment. Rather, in the section of
Anchor Wate's Opposition discussing the proper interest rate to be applied to the
preference payment, Anchor Wate argued as follows:
Therefore, the rate of prejudgment interest to be applied, if any,
should be determined based on a percentage that appropriately
represents the amount the SAIC estate would have earned had it had
the reinsurance monies under its control during the applicable time
period.
(R-563). Given the foregoing, it is clear that Anchor Wate argued below for a market
rate, not prime plus two. The Liquidator's re-characterization of Anchor Wate's
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Opposition as supporting the application of interest at the prime rate plus two percent
should be seen for what it is, an unfounded attempt to preserve a 10% interest award that
is far above any market investment it might have realized had it maintained control of the
funds.
2.

28 U.S.C. § 1961 sets forth the appropriate market rate.

The Liquidator's argument against the application of the bankruptcy rate is based
on a misconception that that statute does not adequately reflect market conditions.
However, bankruptcy courts choose the rate set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1961 precisely
because it does approximate the market return a preference plaintiff would have received
had the funds been invested rather than paid out as a preference. See, e.g.. In re F.A.S.I.,
48 B.R. 147 (Bkrtcy. Conn. 1985) (rejecting application of state's statutory rate of interest
in favor of a "calculation based on prevailing market rate for the time value of money,
e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a)"). Consequently, in arguing for a market rate below, Anchor
Wate preserved the argument for appeal that 28 U.S.C. § 1961(a) should govern the
court's determination of the proper prejudgment interest rate for successful preference
claimants under U.C.A. § 31A-27-321.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the judgment entered by the
District Court in favor of the Liquidator. The undisputed facts establish that the $3.5
million paid by SAIC to Anchor Wate was not "the insurer's property" for purposes of
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Section 31 A-27-321 and was funded by reinsurers who expressly stipulated that the
money was to pay the Anchor Wate claim.
Respectfully submitted this-3_ day of January, 2006.
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